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Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility has become a strategic asset for food firms to demonstrate their good 
environmental conduct. The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of the implementation of 
corporate social responsibility activities on the reorganization of vertical relationships within food 
supply chains. Applying content analysis techniques to the Global Reporting Initiative reports, we 
collected qualitative data on investments in environmentally friendly options, the adoption of 
standards, stakeholder engagement, information searches, impact monitoring activities and chain 
coordination to transform it into quali-quantitative data. We find that the variables affecting chain 
coordination relate to the presence of sourcing standards, effort in discussing with chain partners ways 
to prevent and manage chain environmental impacts, and costs related to stakeholder feedback 
collection. The results of the analysis confirm corporate social responsibility as a strategic tool to 
improve supply chain relationships through an augmented vertical coordination and to integrate 
environmental policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The threats that economic growth poses to the environment are now clearer than ever; as pollution 
and environmental degradation worsen, the awareness of consumers and governments also increases 
(Harper and Snowden, 2017; Ricci et al., 2018). Supply chain stakeholders have a great deal of power 
in steering the trend of markets towards greener alternatives, but they can do it only through the 
adoption of reliable codes of conduct and by providing adequate information on the environmentally 
friendly activities adopted (Ashby et al., 2012; Walker and Jones, 2012; Illge and Preuss, 2012). 
Indeed, certifications and claims are part of this bridge between consumers and companies, but 
greenwashing and a lack of reliable data can lead customers towards uninformed choices (Zhang et 
al., 2014). Reliable and comparable corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports can constitute a 
valid source of information on companies’ environmental conduct, allowing for better informed 
choices by the market and by supply chain stakeholders. CSR has become one of the main strategic 
activities of food firms. 
Several definitions of CSR exist. Among these, the European Commission (2001, p. 6) defines CSR 
as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. In the food sector, an 
increasing number of food companies have introduced voluntary certifications to communicate the 
efforts of their businesses towards the social and environmental aspects of production (Del Giudice 
et al., 2018). 
Empirical research related to CSR has mostly explored the relationships between corporate social 
performance and competitiveness (Ambec and Barla 2006; Pasurka 2008, Marin et al., 2017, Briones 
Peñalver et al., 2018), the incentives that firms have to adopt CSR standards (Shauki, 2011), the 
financial consequences related to the implementation of such rules (Hartmann, 2011), and the effects 
of CSR rule implementation on human resource management (HRM) (Celma et al, 2011). To the best 
of our knowledge, no study has yet investigated the effects of CSR activities on supply chain 
coordination. 
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We aim to contribute to fill this knowledge gap and extend the existing literature by addressing the 
following research questions. 
RQ1: Does the implementation of CSR rules lead to a reorganization of supply chain relationships? 
RQ2: How might the activities conducted to implement CSR rules affect the reorganization of vertical 
relationships? 
To answer to these research questions, we consider CSR rules institutions, and we refer to transaction 
cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985) as the framework for our analysis to explain possible 
vertical coordination variations due to the implementation of such rules. According to TCE, the 
choice of economic agents among different forms of transaction governance depends on transaction 
costs, i.e., information, negotiating and monitoring costs, and transaction attributes associated with 
vertical exchanges, i.e., transaction asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. We believe that the 
adoption of CSR rules impacts the characteristics of the transactions and, thus, transaction costs. 
Consequently, the implementation of such rules should have an impact on the level of vertical 
coordination among supply chain agents. 
To collect data on CSR rules and activities implemented by food firms, we conducted a content 
analysis on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reports of European companies operating in the 
food and beverages sector. GRI standards are disclosure guidelines for CSR reports aimed at 
standardizing CSR reporting practices. The information included in the reports was categorized on 
the basis of Williamson’s theory. More specifically, we analyzed the relations between transaction 
costs and transaction characteristics with the variation of vertical coordination established to apply 
the GRI rules. We position our analysis within the context of the European agrofood industry. 
Within this context, the research questions of the study find strong support in the stream of literature 
that shows the significant contribution of voluntary standards to the coordination of supply chains. 
Its contribution to the stream relates to investigating how CSR rules implemented by food firms may 
influence the management and governance of vertical relationships. Such an analysis is also crucial 
for firm management because it not only considers CSR rules firm communication tools it also 
analyzes them as possible instruments for effective firm strategic management. From a policy point 
of view, the study highlights if and in which way voluntary sustainability standards can be considered 
alternative policy instruments to guarantee efficiency in supply chain relationships. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section is devoted to building the conceptual 
framework. We define and justify the main relationships linking CSR rules and chain coordination. 
In section 3, we address the methodology, and in the following section, we present the main results. 
Section 5 is devoted to discussing the results and implications. The last section summarizes the main 
conclusions, including some limitations and future research trajectories. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Corporate social responsibility and sustainability reporting 
 
The interest in social responsibilities connected with the economic activity of firms has emerged in 
the last 60 years. Even though some concerns regarding these issues began to spread in the 1930s and 
1940s, the analysis of company approaches to social responsibility tends to consider more developed 
and recent versions of the concept, starting from the 1950s and 1960s (Carroll, 1999). In the last 
decades, it has gained momentum, as consumers are becoming more aware and concerned about the 
environmental and social impacts of economic activities (Lerro et al., 2018). CSR activities are indeed 
viewed as a means of differentiating otherwise quite similar products and, thus, as a way to gain 
reputation and, quite likely, market shares. 
One of the ways in which CSR can be manifested is via sustainability reports. Sustainability reporting 
is the practice of disclosing the extent to which the organization has contributed positively or 
negatively to the sustainability of the planet (Gray and Milne, 2002). Sustainability reports usually 
also include details about the values, goals, commitments, and strategies of the corporation in relation 
to the different aspects of sustainability. In recent years, an increasing number of firms has compiled 
and made public reports about the impacts of their economic activities and their CSR rules (Kolk, 
2008). In December 2014, the European Commission required that certain large EU companies (more 
than 500 employees) also disclose nonfinancial and diversity information, which includes 
sustainability aspects of the firm’s activities. The regulation targets ‘public interest entities’ and is 
expected to affect approximately 6000 companies across all sectors. More precisely, Regulation 
2014/95/UE requires firms, beginning in 2017, to ‘include in the management report a nonfinancial 
statement containing information to the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking's 
development, performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a minimum, 
environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery 
matters’. The report needs to present the firm’s business model, policies, outcomes of the policies, 
principal risks, and performance indicators related to the abovementioned issues. The report may be 
independent or integrated with the financial report. One of the aims is to improve the disclosure of 
social and environmental information in order to increase transparency about firm operations. This 
may allow stakeholders to get a better picture of the sustainability performance of large corporations 
and, possibly, increase (or decrease) investor and consumer trust (Lo and Kwan, 2017). For firms 
who have not done so already, sustainability reporting may be an occasion for firms to start 
measuring, monitoring and managing the impacts of corporate activities on the environment and on 
society. 
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Sustainability reporting may be accomplished independently by each firm; however, reporting 
standards exist. Reporting standards have emerged to try to reduce the likelihood of sustainability 
reports being tailored to highlight only the positive impacts of firm activities and the improvements 
generated by CSR rules. The most famous and widespread sustainability reporting standard is the 
GRI standard developed by the Global Reporting Initiative, an independent international organization 
that has addressed sustainability reporting since 1997. This is a voluntary reporting standard that aims 
at improving the ‘rigour, comparability, auditability and general acceptance’ of sustainability 
reporting practices so that they may become comparable to financial ones (Willis, 2003). Indeed, 
providing a long list of indicators that should be included in a sustainability report, minimum 
requirements to reach different application levels, making reports easier to compare and, thus, to 
evaluate for stakeholders are all ways of increasing the likelihood of information being trustworthy. 
GRI also encourages and provides indications on how to perform external and independent assurance 
of sustainability reports (Toppinen et al. 2011; GRI, 2013). 
In the present analysis, we use sustainability reports as a means to capture how environmentally 
related activities and objectives are integrated along the chain. 
 
2.2 CSR and vertical coordination 
We consider CSR rules institutions. According to Davis and North (1971), institutions are ‘a set of 
rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange, and distribution’. Such rules influence the 
behavior of economic agents (North, 1990) and have the aim of reducing transaction uncertainty and 
minimizing transaction costs (Ménard, 2017).  
However, the reduction of economic uncertainty can be achieved if economic agents effectively 
reorganize transactions on the basis of the activities and efforts conducted to implement CSR rules.  
To analyze the effect of GRI rules on the coordination of food supply chains, we referred to the New 
Institutional Economics approach. More precisely, the analysis of the organizational changes within 
the food chain is conducted throughout the theoretical framework of TCE. We analyze whether the 
implementation of such rules leads to a different structure of transaction characteristics, costs and 
vertical coordination of food supply chains. 
Following Williamson’s theory, the adoption of CSR rules should lead to a variation of transaction 
attributes, i.e., the level of transaction asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. The asset 
specificity of transactions refers to the specific investments that are necessary to conduct a specific 
transaction among supply chain agents (Williamson, 1991). Transaction asset specificity includes 
specialized human, physical, geographical, and intangible investments. Transaction uncertainty 
represents the probability that the conditions set up in vertical agreements will be accomplished. Such 
a transaction attribute is influenced by the lack of information transparency among the economic 
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subjects of transactions. The transaction frequency refers to the lapse of time between one exchange 
and another (Hobbs, 1996). In this analysis, we did not consider the level of frequency because the 
implementation of CSR rules does not affect the frequency of transactions in the supply chain. 
The variation of transaction attributes leads to a variation in transaction costs, i.e., information, 
negotiating and monitoring costs. Information costs are related to the time spent to acquire the 
necessary information to finalize transactions. Negotiating costs are related to the difficulty in settling 
agreements. Monitoring costs are correlated to the necessary resources spent to ensure the respect of 
transaction conditions (Stranieri et al., 2017). TCE postulates that the higher the transaction costs are, 
the higher the probability that economic agents will choose a more coordinated form of transaction 
governance, i.e., hybrids or hierarchy. 
In accordance with Williamson (1979, 1985), the implementation of CSR rules should lead to a 
variation in the characteristics of the transactions. More precisely, the introduction of such rules 
implies an increase in transaction asset specificity, namely, the level of bilateral dependency of 
economic agents, due to the resources invested to fulfil the conditions of the sustainable practices of 
the firms.  
In accordance with Williamson’s theory, higher levels of transaction specific investments lead to 
higher transaction costs and more coordinated vertical relationships.  
Moreover, the level of uncertainty increases within the augmentation of the specificity of the 
transactions. Thus, transaction uncertainty will depend on the bilateral dependency among transacting 
parties. As a consequence, the use of more coordinated transaction governance forms depends mainly 
on the level of the asset specificity of the transactions (Hobbs, 2004; Boger, 2001; Ménard and Klein, 
2004), whereas the level of transaction uncertainty only conditionally affects the transaction 
governance (Williamson, 1979). 
The introduction of CSR rules and the related set of transaction characteristics lead to a different 
structure in transactions costs. Such structures are mainly related to the selection of suppliers in 
compliance with the company sustainability-related rules, i.e., information costs, and the time spent 
to ensure that transacting parties respect the rules established, i.e., monitoring costs. In accordance 
with Williamson (1985) and Ménard and Valceschini (2005), higher levels of information and 
monitoring costs, in our case due to the implementation of CSR rules, could lead to a higher level of 
vertical coordination. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
To operationalize the variables of our conceptual framework, we use the information disclosed by 
European food industry firms that adopt the GRI standard for sustainability reporting. Specifically, 
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the data were collected via the GRI reports of all the firms included in the ‘Food and Beverage 
Products’ sector of the GRI Sustainability Disclosure database whose report had been released after 
2010 and in English.  
This selection criterion, in April 2016, led to a total of 69 entries. However, some of these had to be 
excluded because of the absence of the report in the database, because the firm was not part of the 
food industry (but part of the retailing, distribution or input sectors) or its activities in the food sector 
were not its main focus, or because only one GRI report was available. The final sample consisted of 
53 reports by 53 food and beverage firms, which corresponds to 77% of the entire target universe. 
All the reports considered followed either the GRI-G3 (12 reports), GRI-G3.1 (9 reports) or GRI-G4 
(32 reports) standards.  
All the sustainability reports were read thoroughly, and their text was analyzed and evaluated 
according to content analysis techniques. The reports vary in length, detail, structure and style. The 
analyzed reports ranged from 20 to 260 pages, with an average of 88 pages, for a total of 4672 pages. 
Some reports include the firm’s annual report, and other reports are entirely dedicated to corporate 
sustainability reporting. The use of content analysis allowed us to transform the qualitative data into 
quali-quantitative data, which may more easily be compared and analyzed quantitatively. This 
conversion is based on an explicit coding process (Chen et al., 2015). Indeed, following previous 
literature (Montabon et al., 2007), to operationalize the vertical coordination, transaction 
characteristics and cost variables, the content of the text of each report was analyzed in detail, and 
the firm’s performance on the different dimensions was assessed on a 5 point scale defined as follows: 
level 0 indicates that the issue at stake is not discussed in the report; level 1 is assigned when the issue 
is only briefly or implicitly mentioned; level 2 is applied when the issue is described, but in a vague 
manner; level 3 indicates that there is a detailed description of the actions taken to tackle the issue 
under consideration; level 4 is assigned to firms that include in the report a very detailed and 
quantitative (when applicable) discourse of the issue, including foreseen efforts to improve operations 
in the future.  
For each of the firms included in the final sample, financial data was also collected from the Amadeus 
Database published by Moody's Analytics / Bureau van Dijk. These consist of data on the firm’s 
employees and the firm’s public/private status (See Table 1 for a more detailed description). 
 
3.2 Variable description 
On the basis of our conceptual framework and on data availability, we built thirteen variables 
pertaining to vertical coordination on environmental sustainability issues and transaction 
characteristics and related costs. Four of these variables were directly taken by the GRI standard 
indicators, the other eight variables were created on the basis of our research interest and the previous 
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literature (Chen et al., 2015; Montabon et al., 2007) and evaluated by analyzing all the parts of the 
reports that could be relevant.  
More specifically, the dependent variable adopted to test the conceptual framework is the level of 
coordination of the firm with its suppliers through the collaboration on environmental issues 
(Coord_Env). The dependent variable was operationalized using the latest report available, while we 
used the previous one to measure the explanatory variables in order to avoid unnecessary endogeneity 
and to have a minimum time of one year to evaluate the effects of CSR strategies on supply chain 
coordination.  
There are twelve explanatory variables pertaining to environmental sustainability measures, and they 
relate to transaction asset specificity, information costs and monitoring costs (Stranieri et al., 2017). 
Among the transaction asset specificity variables, we consider four variables: specific investments 
for environmental sustainability (AS1i), sourcing standards (AS2i), local suppliers (AS3i), and supplier 
competence (AS4i). The first variable measures the level of specific investments adopted to improve 
the environmental sustainability performance of the firm. This variable includes, for example, the 
firm’s investments in new packaging-related equipment for energy saving issues and the use of 
recyclable packaging material (Agrokor) or improvements in energy, water, waste and atmospheric 
emissions management (Bonduelle). The second variable is taken from one of the GRI guideline 
indicators specifically developed for the food processing sector: ‘percentage of purchased volume 
from suppliers compliant with company’s sourcing policy’ (G4-FP1). This variable is related to firm 
sourcing management. The adoption of a sourcing policy means agents are locked into a transaction 
with specific characteristics. Suppliers invest to respect the sourcing policy requirements, and the 
firm itself will comply with the sourcing policy to build and maintain its brand equity. The variable 
measures if there are sourcing standards and how strongly these are followed. The third variable is 
related to geographical asset specificity and relates to a specific GRI guideline indicator: ‘Proportion 
of spending on local suppliers at significant locations of operation’ (G4-EC9). The last transaction 
asset specificity variable is instead related to human asset specificity, as it evaluates the firm 
investments/effort to build suppliers’ competence and to intensify knowledge transfer along the chain. 
Regarding information cost variables, we evaluate firm effort to identify and engage with 
environmentally responsible suppliers, discuss environmental impacts along the chain, identify 
stakeholders and their perceptions. More specifically, the ‘environmentally responsible suppliers’ 
variable (IC1i) is built on the basis of the information disclosed in relation to the GRI guidelines 
indicator ‘Percentage of new suppliers that were screened using environmental criteria’ (G4-EN32). 
This variable aims at identifying the information costs incurred by searching and choosing suppliers 
on the basis of their environmental performance. Moreover, we evaluate the effort of identifying 
potential environmental impacts of chain activities. In this direction, variable ‘impact discussion’ 
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(IC2i) evaluates the level of effort put into discussing how to prevent supply chain environmental 
impacts. Information costs related to the process of identifying and collecting data about chain 
stakeholders are comprised in the ‘stakeholder identification’ variable (IC3i) and stakeholder 
environmental performance perception (IC4i). The latter relates to the firm activities to gather 
information about customer and stakeholder perception about the chain’s environmental 
performance.  
The monitoring cost variables appraise the presence of control measures on the negative 
environmental impacts along the supply chain. Specifically, the first variable (MC1i) is built on the 
basis of the GRI guidelines indicator ‘Significant actual and potential negative environmental impacts 
in the supply chain and actions taken’ (G4-EN33). This indicator is aimed at evaluating if an action 
is taken to monitor and respond to negative environmental impacts along the chain. An additional 
variable, namely, the stakeholder feedback variable, was built to capture the firm’s effort to collect 
(and take into consideration) stakeholder feedback (MC2i). Moreover, we also built a variable to 
account for costs related to actual performance audits (MC3i) and/or life-cycle assessments (MC4i). 
The former variable relates to independent external audits of environmental performance, looking 
also at how extensive they are and if the results are made public. The latter variable refers to the costs 
related to product life-cycle assessment analyses. 
A set of four control variables (Czi) were also included in the model. GRI experience (C1i) is 
considered a proxy for the organizations’ understanding and communication of the impact of their 
business on critical sustainability issues, such as climate change, human rights, corruption and many 
others. GRI experience is operationalized using the number of years of using GRI standards for 
sustainability reports calculated as a difference from the last available report to the first. Firm size 
(C2i) is also a critical aspect. Researchers have demonstrated that this factor has a direct effect on the 
publication of sustainability reports (Lee, 2017). It has been observed that the larger the firm, the 
more likely it is to use resources for social and environmental reports (Guthrie et al., 2008). Firm size 
is measured using the number of employees reported in the last annual report. We also introduced the 
dummy variable ‘firm status’ (C3i) to control for the status of the firm (1 = public company; 0 = 
private company) and to explore the impact of a more complex firm structure (public) on the level of 
coordination among supply chain partners on environmental issues with respect to simpler 
organizational forms (private). Finally, we controlled for the geographical location (C4i) of the firm 
to investigate the possible effects of the area where the firms are established (Northern, Eastern, 
Western and Southern Europe) on the level of coordination among supply chain partners on 
environmental issues. Table 1 summarizes all the variables used in our analysis: their descriptions, 
average value, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value. 
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---------insert Table 1 around here---------- 
 
3.3 Data analysis 
Our dependent variable measures the level of coordination among supply chain partners through 
collaboration on environmental issues. Because the dependent variable is based on ordered 
categorical data, cumulative link models are recommended. The definition of cumulative link models 
is adopted from Agresti (2002), but such models are often called ordinal regression models or ordered 
logit/probit models (Greene and Hensher, 2010). They represent by far the most popular class of 
ordinal regression models. 
According to Agresti (2002), a cumulative link model with a logit link is defined as 
 !"#$%&'(,*+ = !"#$%[.(0( ≤ 2)] = 5* + 789					2 = 1,2, … , > − 1  [1] 
 
where P('@ ≤ $) is the cumulative probability (i.e., the probability that the ith individual is in the jth 
or higher category at time t+1), 89 is a vector of explanatory variables for the ith observation at time 
t, ABC	7 is the corresponding set of regression parameters and tells us how a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable increases the log odds of being higher than category j. The parameter aj provides 
each cumulative logit (for each j) with its own intercept, and it varies between categories and satisfies 
the constraints AD ≤ AE ≤ ⋯ ≤ A*GD. A key point is that individuals in the sample are assumed to be 
categorized independently of each other. Our cumulative link model specification is the following: 
 !"#$%&Coord_Env(,*+ = 5* + PQ"B%R"!S@,( + PTSSU%_SVUW@,( + PXBY"_W"S%@,( + PZ"B_W"S%@,(				 2 = 1,… , 4			$ = 1,… , 53                        [2] 
 
where Coord_Env(,* is the vector of the dependent variable — the level of coordination of the firm 
with its suppliers on environmental sustainability issues; Q"B%R"!S@,( represents the vector of the zth 
control variables; and PTSSU%_^VUW@,(, PXBY"_Q"S%@,(, PZ"B_Q"S%@,( represent the vector of the 
explanatory variables asset specificity, information costs and monitoring costs. 
We used the clm command from the Ordinal package in the R 3.4.2 software to estimate the 
cumulative link model (R Core Team 2013). The coefficients from the model can be difficult to 
interpret because they are scaled in terms of logs. Another way to interpret logistic regression models 
is to use the antilog to estimate the coefficients into odds ratios (O.R.). This procedure allows for a 
better understanding and comparison of coefficients in the full model (Model V). 
In addition, we assessed the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the log-likelihood to 
evaluate the goodness of fit of the models. A general way to compare models is using the likelihood 
ratio test (LR). The LR statistic measures the evidence in the data that supports the extra complexity 
of nested models. As a base model that we compare our results against, we also present the outcome 
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with only the control variables. Indeed, Model I in Table 3 reports the effect of the control variables 
on the dependent variable, Coord_Env. Model II shows the results of the controls plus those of the 
asset specificity variables. Model III provides the results of the controls plus those of the information 
cost variables, while Model IV provides the results of the controls plus those of the monitoring cost 
variables. Finally, Model V presents the results for the full model when all the variables are included 
(control variables, asset specificity variables, information cost variables, and monitoring cost 
variables). 
Moreover, we tested the robustness of our results and the assumption of the proportional odds 
against alternative model specifications. One way to do this is by comparing the proportional odds 
logistic model with a multinomial logit model. The latter is typically used to model unordered 
variables, while the former is nested in the multinomial model; thus, we performed an LR test to see 
if the models are statistically different, but we found no significant differences. Hence, the results of 
the multinomial model are qualitatively consistent with those presented in Table 3. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 and Table 2 report, respectively, the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. The data 
show that all the explanatory variables are positively correlated to the dependent variable, 
Coord_Env. The correlation values among the explanatory variables are relatively low, except for 
AS4i with IC2i and for IC3i with MC2i and MC1i. To avoid serious collinearity bias and to optimize our 
estimations, we decided to remove from our models the variables AS4i, IC3i and MC1i. Collinearity is 
further supported by measuring the variation inflation factors (VIFs) for each model and was found 
not to be a problem, with the VIF values below the cut-off point of 5 (O’Brien, 2007).  
With regard to the firms’ general characteristics (see Table 1), the average number of employees in 
our sample is approximately 16000, varying from a minimum of 45 employees for the Belgian 
company Warnez specialized in growing, washing, sorting and packaging potatoes for supermarkets 
and the catering sector to 328000 employees for Swiss multinational Nestlè. The sample is mainly 
composed of large and very large firms, such as Nestlè, Danone, Carlsberg and Heineken. This sample 
structure pinpoints that the use of GRI standards is a prerogative of medium and large businesses. On 
average, companies have adopted GRI sustainability standards for approximately 4 years, varying 
from a minimum of 2 years (e.g., Lavazza an Italian coffee roaster, Lotus bakeries a Belgium baked 
products producer or Grupo Calvo a Spanish fish producers) to a maximum of 12 years of 
commitment in GRI reporting in the case of Diageo plc., an English alcoholic beverage producer. 
Most of the agrofood firms in our sample are private companies (approximately 70%); in contrast, 
publicly quoted companies represent only 30% of the total sample. Finally, regarding the 
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geographical distribution of the firms, 9% of the sample is located in Eastern Europe, 28% in Northern 
Europe, 19% in Southern Europe, and 44% in Western Europe. 
----insert Table 2 around here------- 
Table 3 reports the proportional odds logistic coefficient estimates for the cumulative link model 
regressions. The overall fit of the full model (Model V) increases compared to the baseline (Model 
I), denoting that the full model better fits our data (AIC values decrease, and log-likelihood increases). 
Moreover, the LR test shows that Models II, III, IV and V improve significantly with respect to the 
base Model I (Pr > LR test is 0.001). In other words, the introduction of the three classes of 
explanatory variables (transaction asset specificity, information costs, and monitoring costs) adds 
more explanatory power to our models in explaining our dependent variable.  
Model I presents the effects of the control variables on the level of coordination among supply chain 
partners on environmental issues (Coord_Env). The coefficient estimates of the variables regarding 
the firm’s status (p < 0.1) and its geographical location (p < 0.1) are statistically significant, 
suggesting that more structured firms (as publicly quoted firms) are more likely to adopt a low level 
of coordination among chain partners, while agrofood companies located in Northern and Western 
Europe are more likely to adopt a significantly higher level of coordination on environmental 
sustainability issues compared to Eastern and Southern European firms. By contrast, the variables 
measuring the GRI experience and firm size do not appear to be significant. This latter result seems 
to support the view that the size of the firms is not relevant in changing vertical relationships on 
environmental matters. In this sense, we must keep in mind that our sample is mainly composed of 
medium and large companies. Small businesses are a priori excluded from this analysis because they 
most likely do not have enough financial and human resources to devote to environmental 
sustainability reporting. 
Concerning Model II, we focus directly on the comment of the explanatory variables related to 
transaction asset specificity because the control variable signs and coefficients remain stable 
compared to the baseline model. This set of variables seems to be positively correlated with the level 
of coordination among supply chain partners on environmental issues, but the only statistically 
significant variable (p>0.001) is the sourcing standards variable (AS2i). Specifically, if we look at the 
odd ratios of the asset specificity variables in Model V, we can see that the percentage of purchased 
volume from suppliers, compliant with company’s sourcing policy, has one of the highest 
contributions to the dependent variable. Thus, firms with higher levels of compliance with sourcing 
standards tend have engaged in greater changes in vertical coordination in relation to collaboration 
on environmental issues. In contrast, the variables related to local suppliers (AS3i) and specific 
investments for environmental sustainability (AS1i) are positive, but there is no evidence to support a 
significant effect on the dependent variable. 
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Regarding information costs (Model III), all the variables, i.e., ‘environmentally sustainable 
suppliers’ (IC1i), ‘impact discussion’ (IC2i), and ‘stakeholder environmental performance perception’ 
(IC4i), have a positive impact on the dependent variables, but only the effects of the first two variables 
seem to be significant. Indeed, seeking information and choosing environmentally sustainable 
suppliers (p < 0.1) and discussing prevention of chain environmental impacts (p < 0.001) seem to be 
relevant factors in impacting chain coordination. 
Finally, we found that monitoring cost variables also has a positive influence on the level of 
coordination among supply chain partners on environmental issues. Specifically, if we look at the 
odds ratio in Model V, costs related to collecting stakeholder feedback (MC2i) and to independent 
audits (MC3i) have a significant impact on chain coordination (at the 0.001 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively), while those related to life cycle assessment analyses (MC4i) do not seem to be 
statistically significant. 
The analysis of the full model with all the explanatory variables (Model V) mainly confirms the 
previous results both in term of the effects of the control variables and the explanatory variables. The 
estimates and the significance of the coefficients of the control and independent variables remain 
stable compared to the baseline model and models II, III and IV, except for IC1i and MC3i, which lost 
their significance because they are very close to the threshold of acceptability. 
 
-----insert Table 3 around here-------- 
 
5. Discussion 
The data show that the explanatory variables are tightly correlated to the dependent variable that 
measures vertical coordination on sustainability performance. More specifically, the results suggest 
that the more structured firms, as publicly quoted firms, are more likely to adopt lower levels of chain 
coordination in relation to environmental issues. This is probably because such firms have to comply 
with specific procedures related to the disclosure of financial, social and environmental information 
in order to be listed on stock exchanges and to attract a large number of investors. This fact leads 
public companies to a more stringent implementation of CSR rules, but therefore, this does not also 
mean higher levels of environmental coordination along the supply chain. Public companies seem to 
be more opportunistic and driven by self interest in these kinds of relationships with suppliers than 
private and family firms. Public companies operating at a more global level and, consequently, more 
sensitive to sudden changes in the market tend to value flexibility, independence and short-term 
relationships with chain actors as a strategic tool than other types of businesses keener on exploiting 
value from long-term relationships (Peterson et al., 2001). 
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Moreover, our results suggest that there may be a geographical pattern in the effects of environmental 
sustainability on vertical relations. Indeed, we find that agrofood companies located in Northern and 
Western Europe are more likely to register higher levels in supply chain coordination compared with 
Eastern and Southern European firms. This could be related to the higher interest of stakeholders in 
those regions in environmental sustainability matters (Camarero et al., 2013; Beltrán-Esteve and 
Picazo-Tadeo, 2017). This could indeed induce companies to go the extra step in the adoption of CSR 
goals, which requires an integration of goals along the whole supply chain, and this can lead to more 
vertical collaboration and coordination. Furthermore, in our sample of medium to large food firms, 
experience with GRI reporting and the size of the firm do not seem to be relevant in shaping vertical 
relationships due to collaboration on environmental issues. 
The results indicate that, instead, most of the transaction cost economic variables included in our 
conceptual framework are relevant in shaping coordination among supply chain partners. More 
specifically, we find that transaction asset specificity, information costs and monitoring costs show a 
relevant and positive impact on the level of vertical coordination. More precisely, we find that the 
most significant variables affecting chain coordination related to improved collaboration on 
environmental matters relate to the presence of sourcing standards, the augmented effort in discussing 
with chain partners ways to prevent and manage chain environmental impacts, and increased 
monitoring costs related to stakeholder feedback collection. 
These results achieved in the analysis seem to suggest that TCE can be considered a useful framework 
to describe the organizational structures derived by the introduction of CSR rules within the food 
supply chain. Such a framework helps to answer to our research questions by highlighting that CSR 
rules may affect the reorganization of vertical relationships when economic agents carry out specific 
investments for their implementation, which imply different structures in transaction costs and, thus, 
a positive impact on the increased vertical coordination of economic relationships within food supply 
chains. 
More precisely, the positive link between the specificities of transactions due to the implementation 
of CSR rules suggests that the implementation of CSR rules requires specific investments and 
increases transaction costs. Such a result corroborates the idea to consider CSR rules institutions, i.e., 
rules that affect the way economic agents conduct and coordinate business relationships. For example, 
the adoption of sourcing standards or the variations in supplier selection methods stress how food 
firms change business activities in order to comply with CSR rules. 
Moreover, the analysis also highlights that such rules have an effect on the actual organization of 
transactions within the food supply chain. More precisely, it suggests that supply chain partners will 
construct more tightened relationships in order to mitigate the behavioral uncertainty that increases 
with the increased bilateral dependency among supply chain partners. Thus, CSR can be considered 
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not only a communication tool by food firms, able to inform customers about the way business is 
conducted, but also a way to foster more tight transactions among supply chain partners. Indeed, such 
rules can be considered instruments to improve collaboration and long-lasting vertical relationships. 
From a managerial perspective, the findings of the analysis suggest that CSR can be considered a way 
to achieve more closed economic relationships in terms of more coordinated transactions. In the case 
of transactions regulated mainly through market-based governance forms, the introduction of rules 
related to the sustainability of business activities could help to achieve more efficient relationships in 
terms of increased coordination and, consequently, improved transparency. Indeed, from a 
managerial point of view, CSR could be a tool that promotes chain collaboration and, thus, a more 
efficient management of vertical relations that may improve performance and allow for differentiation 
opportunities in the market. 
From a policy point of view, CSR rules can become an alternative form of transaction governance 
that may integrate public regulation for environmental matters. Indeed, it favors transparency, 
efficiency and environmental performance via self-regulation. These factors can also potentially 
strengthen chain relationships and performance and thus also economic gains, in addition to those 
related to better environmental performance. 
 
6. Conclusion, limitations and future research directions 
The results of the present analysis highlight the role of CSR rules in shaping vertical relationships 
within the food supply chain, and they suggest a new way to consider such rules. In addition to being 
considered part of the business strategy to build firm reputation and provide a means of 
differentiation, such rules can be considered a way to reorganize transactions by improving supply 
chain collaboration and to foster more transparent and efficient vertical relationships. 
When analyzing the insights from this study, however, a few limitations and possible future 
trajectories should be taken into account. 
First, qualitative research always raises questions about the quality of the data collected. Even if the 
data is collected and processed by experts with the utmost attention, data is strongly affected by which 
attributes are selected, and important dimensions might be left out.  
Second, the analysis is applied to a single industry. In addition, only a relatively small number of 
medium and large enterprises disclose CSR reports in English using GRI standards. Thus, these 
results should be interpreted prudently. Similar studies could be extended to other sectors that present 
different structural characteristics in order to improve the generalizability of the results. 
Finally, we used a cross-sectional analysis to investigate the links between CSR rules and chain 
coordination processes. Future analyses using longitudinal data (when more data and more CSR 
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reports are available) could improve our understanding of the dynamics of CSR rules on supply chain 
coordination; in this case, a longitudinal regression would better represent these dynamics. 
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Table 1: Variables description and descriptive statistics 
Variables Description Min Max Mean Median Std.dev 
Dependent Variables       
Coord_Env 
Coordination level among supply chain partners through 
improved collaboration on environmental issues (0=no 
coordination; 4=high level of coordination) 
0 4 2.34 2 1.33 
Control Variables       
GRI exp Number of years in using GRI standards 2 12 4.42 4 3.19 
Firm's size Number of employees of the firm  45 328000 16169.70 1700 48525.69 
Public (Yes=1) 
The type of firm 
 (Dummy variable: 1 = Publicly quoted company; 0 = Private 
company) 
0 1 0.30 0 0.46 
Geo area_East 
(Yes=1) Geographical location of the firm (Eastern Europe) 0 1 0.09 0 0.30 
Geo area_North 
(Yes=1) Geographical location of the firm (Northern Europe) 0 1 0.28 0 0.45 
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Geo area_South 
(Yes=1) Geographical location of the firm (Southern Europe) 0 1 0.19 0 0.39 
Geo area_West 
(Yes=1) Geographical location of the firm (Western Europe) 0 1 0.44 0 0.50 
Exploratory variables       
AS1i Level of specific material investments for environmental sustainability (0=no investments; 4=high level of investments) 0 4 1.74 2 1.08 
AS2i Level of sourcing standards for environmental sustainability (0=no sourcing standards; 4=high level of sourcing standards) 0 4 2.28 2 1.35 
AS3i Level of purchase from local suppliers (0=no purchase; 4=high level of purchase) 0 4 1.64 2 1.47 
AS4i Level of specific investments to build supplier competence (0=no investments; 4=high level of investments) 0 4 1.32 1 1.36 
IC1i Level of effort/costs for identifying environmentally responsible suppliers (0=no effort; 4=high level of effort) 0 4 1.26 1 1.43 
IC2i 
Level of effort/discussion with chain partners for 
preventing/managing supply chain environmental impacts 
(0=no discussion; 4=high level of discussion) 
0 4 1.62 2 1.32 
IC3i Level of effort/costs for identifying of chain stakeholders (0=no effort; 4=high level of effort) 0 4 2.74 3 1.15 
IC4i 
Level of effort/costs to collect information on stakeholder 
environmental performance perception (0=no effort; 4=high 
level of effort) 
0 4 1.21 1 1.29 
MC1i 
Level of effort/costs for identifying and responding to negative 
environmental impacts in the supply chain (0=no effort; 4=high 
level of effort) 
0 4 2.02 2 1.31 
MC2i Level of effort/costs to collect stakeholder feedback (0=no effort; 4=high level of effort) 0 4 2.28 2 1.35 
MC3i 
Level of independent audits of environmental performance 
(0=no audits; 4=extensive audits whose results are made 
public) 
0 4 1.30 0 1.54 
MC4i Level of effort/costs for product life-cycle assessment analyses (0= no LCA analyses; 4= extensive LCA analyses) 0 4 1.57 2 1.46 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Coord_Env 1                    
2 GRI exp -0.24*   1                   
3 Firm's size -0.06     0.16    1                  
4 Public (Yes=1) -0.20     0.16     0.22    1                 
5 Geo area_East (Yes=1) -0.23*    0.04    -0.09     0.07    1                
6 Geo area_North (Yes=1)  0.12     0.18    -0.07     0.04    -0.20    1               
7 Geo area_South (Yes=1) -0.23*   -0.08    -0.06    -0.32*   -0.16    -0.30*   1              
8 Geo area_West (Yes=1)  0.21    -0.13     0.17     0.17    -0.28*   -0.55*** -0.42**  1             
9 AS1i  0.17     0.05     0.09    -0.03     0.02    -0.20     0.12     0.07    1            
10 AS2i  0.62*** -0.28*    0.09    -0.02    -0.12    -0.04    -0.17     0.24*    0.18    1           
11 AS3i  0.08     0.07    -0.10    -0.04     0.12    -0.16     0.09     0.01    -0.16     0.18    1          
12 AS4i  0.65*** -0.20     0.27*   -0.07    -0.08    -0.03    -0.12     0.16     0.27*    0.44***  0.01    1         
13 IC1i  0.36**  -0.15    -0.05     0.37**  -0.01     0.09    -0.26*    0.13     0.13     0.27*    0.22     0.29*   1        
14 IC 2i  0.70*** -0.20     0.09    -0.09    -0.15     0.15    -0.08     0.02     0.23     0.44**   0.09     0.80***  0.43**  1       
15 IC 3i  0.67*** -0.22     0.17    -0.10    -0.10    -0.15    -0.02     0.20     0.24*    0.46***  0.13     0.45***  0.22     0.48*** 1      
16 IC 4i  0.31*   -0.03     0.09    -0.20    -0.05    -0.23*    0.19     0.10     0.15     0.12     0.09     0.35*    0.03     0.32*    0.49*** 1     
17 MC1i  0.66*** -0.05     0.04    -0.01    -0.10     0.02    -0.19     0.19     0.22     0.49***  0.16     0.46***  0.35*    0.47***  0.57***  0.26*   1    
18 MC 2i  0.26*   -0.03     0.22     0.05     0.17    -0.20     0.15    -0.04     0.32*    0.16     0.08     0.18     0.23*    0.26*    0.62***  0.44***  0.36**  1   
19 MC 3i  0.22     0.01     0.13     0.09    -0.15     0.15     0.06    -0.10     0.10     0.13    -0.06     0.06     0.14     0.10     0.41**   0.41**   0.22     0.33*   1  
20 MC 4i  0.23    -0.18     0.16    -0.06    -0.13    -0.04     0.18    -0.03     0.30*    0.34*    0.02     0.38**   0.17     0.33*    0.23*    0.00     0.19     0.25*   -0.02    1 
Notes: Significance levels are *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Cumulative link model regression results 
 Ordinal logistic regression models 
Dependent variable – Level of chain coordination 
(Coord_Env) Model I Model II Model III Model IV Full model V 
Intercepts Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. O.R. 
ESE 0|1 -3.748 (0.844)*** 
-1.250 
(1.028) 
-2.609 
(0.946)** 
-0.524 
(1.121) 
1.236 
(1.325) 
 
ESE 1|2 -2.887 (0.775)*** 
-0.252 
(0.989) 
-1.505 
(0.885)** 
0.771 
(1.111) 
2.758 
(1.319) 
 
ESE 2|3 -1.252 (0.648)* 
1.936 
(0.977)* 
0.589 
(0.827) 
3.579 
(1.200)** 
6.388 
(1.598) 
 
ESE 3|4 0.010 (0.639) 
3.635 
(1.083)* 
2.168 
(0.882)* 
5.839 
(1.396)*** 
9.178 
(1.903) 
 
Control variables             
GRI exp -0.115 (0.087) 
-0.043 
(0.099) 
-0.086 
(0.093) 
0.042 
(0.108) 
0.151 
(0.122) 1.163 
Firm's size 0.000 (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)* 
0.000 
(0.000)* 1.000 
Public (Yes=1) -1.225 (0.604)* 
-1.290 
(0.639)* 
-2.107 
(0.743)** 
-1.775 
(0.702)* 
-2.510 
(0.902)** 0.081 
Geo area_East (Yes=1) -1.754 (0.905)* 
-2.084 
(1.013)* 
-2.631 
(1.046)* 
-0.701 
(1.018) 
-1.605 
(1.286) 0.201 
Geo area_South (Yes=1) -2.152 (0.849)* 
-2.142 
(0.971)* 
-2.920 
(0.997)** 
-1.785 
(0.905)* 
-1.902 
(1.165)* 0.149 
Geo area_West (Yes=1) 0.048 (0.616) 
-0.316 
(0.686) 
-0.174 
(0.678) 
1.281 
(0.769) 
1.015 
(0.943) 2.760 
Explanatory variables: Transaction asset 
specificity             
AS1i  0.333 (0.285) 
  -0.051 
(0.352) 0.950 
AS2i  0.982 (0.270)***   
1.108 
(0.344)**  
AS3i  0.192 (0.207)   
-0.060 
(0.246) 0.942 
      3.027 
Explanatory variables: Information costs             
IC1i   0.542 (0.245)*  
0.241 
(0.296) 1.273 
IC2i   1.756 (0.376)***  
1.662 
(0.454)*** 5.270 
IC4i   0.393 (0.241)  
-0.064 
(0.343) 0.938 
Explanatory variables: Monitoring costs             
MC2i    0.453 (0.250)* 
0.473 
(0.284)* 1.604 
MC3i    0.518 (0.202)* 
0.366 
(0.26) 1.441 
MC4i       0.084 (0.235) 
-0.316 
(0.282) 0.729 
No. of observations 53 53 53 53 53  
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 169.07 153.27 156.41 134.42 130.43  
Log likelihood -74.49 -63.63 -65.21 -54.21 -46.21  
LR test (change over the base model)   21.73*** 18.59*** 40.57*** 56.56***   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; Significance levels are *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1; link=logit; "Northern Europe" reference level for 
geo area; Likelihood-ratio (LR) test: models II, III, IV and V vs. model I. 
 
 
